The Evolution of Grain Policy Beyond Europe: Ottoman Grain Administration in the Late Eighteenth Century by Seven Agir
 
 
   
 
ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
P.O. Box 208629 









The Evolution of Grain Policy Beyond Europe: 
Ottoman Grain Administration in the  






















Notes: Center discussion papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comments.  
  
I would like to thank Tim Guinnane and Naomi Lameroux for their helpful 
comments and suggestions. The Evolution of Grain Policy Beyond Europe: 
Ottoman Grain Administration in the Late Eighteenth Century 
 
Seven Ağır, Yale University, Department of Economics 
 
May 30, 2011 
 
Abstract:  
During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman policy-makers adopted a more 
liberal attitude towards price formation. This was accompanied by the fiscal and 
administrative centralization of the grain trade. These seemingly contradictory policy changes 
could, in part, be explained in the context of conjectural changes in grain demand and supply, 
which rendered pre-emptive privileges and price controls less effective. The policy change, 
however, was not only a practical response to the strains on the pre-existing supply network 
but also reflected a new concern with the state of agricultural production along with the 
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The Evolution of Grain Policy Beyond Europe: 
Ottoman Grain Administration in the Late Eighteenth Century 
 
 
In the history of hunger, of grain distribution, and of governmental policy toward the 




Whether marked by “universally acknowledged” milestones or not, the notion that Western 
Europe followed a distinctive economic path resulting in its domination of the rest of the 
world is widespread. Yet even asking how the region gained advantages that eventually made 
it the nexus of wealth and power not only presumes its unity as an economic space, but also 
implies a contrast with what lies beyond its borders. Recent debates on the “great divergence” 
between Western Europe and the rest of the world have brought these comparative questions 
to the forefront of research.
2  
Unfortunately, the Ottoman Empire, with its history spanning over six centuries and 
three continents, has found little place in this comparative literature. Şevket Pamuk and 
Kıvanç Karaman’s study on the Ottoman fiscal centralization with a focus on other European 
states represents a remarkable exception.
3 By studying the evolution of the Ottoman tax 
collection institutions in a comparative framework, the study offered a fertile ground for 
discussing the limits and potentials of Ottoman institutional change. Another exception has 
been Timur Kuran’s study on Islamic law and organizational forms. In its comparative 
pursuit, however, Kuran starts with the observed differences in modern and Islamic forms of 
economic organization and mostly focuses on the lack of (sufficient) change in the latter.
4 
 
1   Hufton (1895: 105).  
2   For a broader debate on the paradigm of the Rise of the West, see Goldstone (2002), Landes (1998), 
North (1990), Pomeranz (2000), Goody (1996), Allen (2011) and Clark (2008). 
3   Karaman and Pamuk (2010). 
4    Kuran (2010). 2 
 
                                                     
This study approaches to the question of Ottoman institutional change from another angle, 
focusing on the changes in the redistributive policies of the Ottoman Empire, against the 
background of grain market liberalization in Europe.   
During the second half of the eighteenth century, most governments in Europe 
attempted to remove ages-old restrictions on their grain trade and establish a free domestic 
market.
5 Although there were differences among policy-makers about what would constitute 
the appropriate degree and timing of liberalization, an intellectual reorientation is clearly 
noticeable: A free domestic grain market was presented as both a better alternative to the 
traditional regulatory policies in meeting the needs of the urban masses and a necessary 
condition for agricultural growth and international competitiveness. This paper will show that 
the incipient liberalization pursued almost simultaneously in various parts of Europe 
resonated with Ottoman reformers’ ideas on regulation in grain trade. Starting with the 1780s, 
Ottoman policy-makers adopted a more liberal attitude towards price-formation in grain 
markets and considered removing pre-emptive privileges. Parallel to the emergence of this 
liberal attitude, however, was the establishment of a centralized administration to finance and 
control a larger portion of the grain trade in the Empire.   
The paper will explain these seemingly contradictory policy changes by examining 
the reformers’ ideas and the actual policy changes, as well as the interface between the two. 
 It will place these changes against the background of conjectural strains on the grain market 
and the increasing interest of the Ottoman ruling elite with the ideas and practices of ‘rival’ 
countries. In the first part of the paper I will present the situation prior to the establishment of 
the Grain Administration. This part will provide an overall survey of government regulation 
in the Ottoman grain trade and its main rationales. The second part of the paper will examine 
 
5   For the attempts at deregulation in French grain trade (1763-64), see Kaplan (1976) and Fox-Genovese 
(1976). For the deregulation in Austrian grain trade (1765-1786), see Grab (1985). For the deregulation in 
Tuscany (1767), see Mirri (1972). For the deregulation in Sweden (1775), see Åmark (1915). 3 
 
                                                     
how the conjectural changes in grain supply and demand in the second half of the eighteenth 
century created strains on the existing system, reducing the effectiveness of traditional policy 
tools and culminating in the establishment of the Grain Administration. The third part of the 
paper will analyze the Ottoman reformers’ ideas on the traditional grain trade policies and 
agricultural production, identifying the range of solutions presented, and describe the 
resulting reforms in the grain trade organization. The fourth part of the paper will examine 
the wider context of the reformers’ concern with the grain policy, presenting the emergence 
of emulation as a developmental strategy. In the conclusion, I will provide an interpretation 
for the policy shift towards a more-centralized-yet-flexible use of regulatory tools in the 
Ottoman grain trade.  
I will argue that the policy changes represented an effort to reconcile traditional 
provisionism that aimed to ensure subsistence of the urban masses with an embryonic 
developmentalism that aimed to improve agricultural basis and further overall wealth of the 
country. The policy shift was not only a practical response to the strains on the pre-existing 
supply network but also reflected a new concern with the state of agricultural production. 
This concern was tied to the emergence of quasi-physiocratic
6 ideas within a new 
mercantilistic
7 outlook among Ottoman reformist elite. In other words, ideational factors 
emerging in the broader realm of the Empire’s economic and military position vis-à-vis more 
developed countries shaped the evolution of grain policy. 
 
 
6   Here Physiocratic does not refer to a complete or strict adherence to the prescriptions of the French 
Physiocrats but implies a heightened interest in the agricultural sector and a more liberal attitude in the domestic 
grain trade. 
7   In this article, I use the word “mercantilistic” to refer to the general aim of accumulating wealth by 
promoting domestic production. 4 
 
                                                     
I 
Istanbul’s grain supply was always an important concern for the Ottoman government. In the 
mid-eighteenth century, the central administration had adopted a system of forced purchases 
in the zones designated as the official hinterland of Istanbul. This system, known as 
comparative quota assessment (mukayese nizamı), was introduced in order to more 
effectively control the movement of surplus grain from the regions within the city’s 
traditional hinterland.
8 Through an investigation of historic Kapan (Istanbul’s central grain 
and flour market) registers, which contained data on how much grain was sent to the capital 
in previous years, the authorities tried to determine how much surplus each district was able 
to produce in normal years. According to these estimates, each district was assigned a 
quantity to be delivered to a designated dock where it was to be sold to the government 
agents or officially-authorized private merchants/ship-owners.
9 The orders written to the 
regions under the quota assessment system indicate that each region was to deliver a certain 
amount of grain, regardless of the specific amounts held by producers and grain-holders. The 
local distribution of the quota assignment was to be made according to a vaguely-defined 
procedure, in which local agents (the judge and officially-recognized notables) were to assess 
and collect the assigned quota responsibility of each household according to their condition 
and endurance capacity (“hâl ve tahammülüne göre”).
10 
The private merchants’ entrance into the trading business was restricted through the 
requirement of licenses. Merchants were allowed to make purchases from the official 
hinterland of Istanbul as long as they held long-term collective contract with the Kapan 
(central grain market), which they acquired by providing a guarantee (kefalet) for other 
 
8   Güçer (1952: 405–407).  
9   Aynural (2001: 5) and Güçer (1952: 405). 
10   Güran (1998: 20). 5 
 
                                                     
merchants.
11 These merchants, known as the merchants of the Kapan, enjoyed pre-emptive 
privileges in the designated docks. In addition to the grain purchased by licensed merchants 
to be sold at the Kapan, the state hired independent merchants
12  or assigned its own 
requisition agents (mubayaacı) to purchase grain to be kept at its storages at the Arsenal 
(Tersane). The government sought to prevent entry of the unlicensed merchants in the grain 
trade using logistical means (by designating official docks for grain exchange) and 
supervision (by requiring the local officials to keep registers about the quantity and quality of 
the grain and the name of each ship-owner).
13 
Various studies on the Ottoman controls over grain trade have revealed the broad 
features of the quota system, which are important for us to understand the subsequent policy 
changes: First, Istanbul’s grain supply was mostly procured from the regions within the 
political realm administered by the Ottoman government and primarily from the northwest 
littoral of the Black Sea and the Danubian coasts. Examining the accounts of grain purchased 
and distributed from the Kapan and the Tersane during the period 1755￿1762, Salih Aynural 
has shown that under this system 85 percent of the grain sold at the Kapan was bought from 
the Black Sea and the Danubian coasts.
14 An examination of the Grain Registers, which 
contain a high number of orders sent to the provinces, and various studies on Istanbul’s 
provisioning corroborate the primacy of the northwest littoral of the Black Sea and the 
Danubian region in the grain provisioning of Istanbul during this period.
15 
  
Second, most of the grain was bought by merchants with their own capital. According 
to the Kapan and Tersane records summarized by Aynural, 93 percent of purchases were 
 
11   Güçer (1951-52: 90-91) and Güçer (1952: 400). 
12   Güçer (1952: 403-404).  
13   The Grain Registers (Zahire Defterleri) are kept at the Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul. From now 
on, these registers will be referred as ZD.. 
14   Aynural (2001: 63-64). 
15   See ZD 11, 13.  See also the studies by M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca (1958: 15) and Özveren (2003: 
228). Mantran (1990, 1: 175, 182), Güçer (1951-1952: 87), Kütükoğlu (1999: 569), McGowan (1987: 13), 
Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru (1988) and  Emecen (1984: 199).   6 
 
                                                     
made by licensed ship-owners and merchants with their own capital.
16 This finding is in line 
with an earlier study by Güçer, which shows that only less than 9 percent of grain was 
delivered to Istanbul using state funds.
17  
Third, the negotiations between grain owners and intermediaries (the authorized 
merchants and the mubayaacıs) over the price of grain were subject to official control, which 
aimed primarily to ensure a sufficiently low bread price in Istanbul. These three statements, 
which summarize the general features of grain-trade organization in the mid-eighteenth 
century, ceased to hold by the last decade of the eighteenth century. Before explaining how 
the main features of the grain provisioning changed, it is first necessary to describe how the 
Ottoman administration tried to control the purchase prices, since the capacity of the 
administration to control these prices is central to the account of change provided below. 
 The Ottoman government used two kinds of price control. The miri price (official 
price) was the kind of price that was used in obligatory transactions between grain producing 
regions and the government, where each jurisdictional unit was asked to deliver a certain 
amount of grain as a whole, regardless of the specific amounts held by producers and grain 
holders. The miri price was much lower than the standing market price. It was not adjusted 
according to the vicissitudes of supply, there was no bargaining involved, and the price 
remained constant for long stretches of time.
18 
The other type of price set in the grain trade was called rayic price; it literally meant 
“current price” and was supposed to be adjusted regularly according to supply conditions. For 
each locality in which licensed merchants or state-assigned requisition agents bought grain to 
be brought to Istanbul, the rayic price was set through a bargaining process whereby the local 
administrators could intervene to keep prices at levels acceptable at the center and not to 
 
16   See  Aynural (2001: 63-64).  
17   See Güçer (1952: 410) and Mantran (1990, 1: 174). 
18   Güran (1984-85: 30) and Aynural (2001: 73).  7 
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allow the negotiations cause substantial delays in timely delivery of grain.
19 Although price-
setting between the grain owners and the officially authorized intermediaries was defined as a 
process based on “mutual consent,”
 20 the fact that the grain owners were not allowed to sell 
their grain to the agents other than those authorized by the central administration invalidated 
the principle of consent in practice.  The fact that the rayic price was indeed a controlled 
price set below the market price is evidenced by numerous official documents referring to 
smuggling, including various cases in which authorities explicitly attest to the gap between 
the rayic price and that offered by the smugglers.
21  
Hence, price controls in this system of forced purchases functioned as an in-kind tax 
on grain owners, exercised through monopsonistic control over grain supply. It was through 
controlling the sale price of grain in Istanbul, however, that the administration tried to restrict 
the monopsony rents of the licensed merchants and transfer these rents from the merchants to 
the consumers, allowing a lower price for the latter. This was enabled by the regulation of the 
baking/milling sector and the designation of the bakers’ guild as the sole customer for the 
grain brought to the city. 
The grain purchased by the licensed merchants had to be delivered to the Kapan, 
where the bakers’ guild and merchants negotiated collectively under the official supervision 
of the judge and Kapan officials.
22 According to the guild regulations, the opening of new 
bakers and mills without the permission of the central administration was strictly forbidden.
 
23 Furthermore, most of the bakeries had their own mill and those that did not were assigned 
to specific mills in their proximity.
24  The import of flour to Istanbul, meanwhile, wa
 
19   See Ergin (1995: 380) and Akgündüz (1990, 1: 371). 
20   Güçer (1952: 401). See the orders contained in the Grain Registers. For instance, ZD, no. 13, p. 61 
(1778).  
21   See Aynural (2001: 40-42) and Orhonlu (1965: 14-16).See also Mantran (1990, 1: 173, 176) for the 
seventeenth-century practices. 
22   Aynural (2001: 59).  
23   See Aynural (2001) and Ergin (1995). 
24   Aynural (2001: 88). 8 
 
                                                     
forbidden; so most of the grain was brought to Istanbul in the form of unprocessed grain, 
rather than as flour or bread.
25 
The formal organization of the baking industry (barriers to entry and vertical 
integration in the baking-milling industry) served two  purposes: First, it enabled an easier 
supervision over bread prices, and consequently over bakers’ profit margin. Second, it 
improved the bakers’ bargaining position against merchants by allowing them collective 
haggling over input prices. As such, the merchants would not be able to raise the price of 
grain to monopoly levels.
26 Under these regulations, the price of bread could be officially 
determined according to the sale price of grain at the Kapan, which in turn depended on the 
local purchasing prices and transportation costs. The maintenance of low legal purchasing 
prices through monopsonistic control over the grain supply was thus a spatial redistributive 
tool to ensure the affordability of bread in Istanbul.  
The effectiveness of such a vertically-integrated chain of controls, however, depends 
on the capacity of the government to enforce barriers to entry. Purchasing prices lower than 
the market price would naturally encourage smuggling and reduce the quantity of grain 
transported to Istanbul below the amount that would be supplied if there were no controls on 
prices. The magnitude of the decrease, on the other hand, would depend on the actual 
capacity of the Ottoman central administration to prevent smuggling. As long as the effect of 
smuggling on the city’s grain supply was minimal in relation to its effect on the sale price in 
Istanbul, the controls would serve their purpose. Although it is impossible to measure the 
exact effectiveness of price controls as a spatial redistributive tool without information on the 
quantities smuggled and the gaps between the market price and the legal price, it is possible 
to discuss how the potential effectiveness of the controls might have changed over time. In 
 
25   Aynural (2001: 63-64). 
26   Keeping input prices low was one of the primary motives for instituting monopolies in other sectors as 
well. See Ergin (1995: 649-650) and Baer (1970). 9 
 
                                                     
the following part, I will argue that the effectiveness of the Ottoman controls over grain trade 
began to diminish towards the end of the eighteenth century because of conjectural changes 
in grain demand and supply. 
II 
In the middle of the eighteenth century, Istanbul had an “exceptionally advantageous 
seaborne access to a vast region,”
27 but more importantly, to a region which was 
geographically more accessible from the Ottoman core than from foreign lands. Navigable 
rivers on the Danubian Plain and the Black Sea connected Istanbul to grain-producing areas 
of the Balkans, while mountains in the northeastern part of the peninsula (Carpathian 
Mountains and Transylvanian Alps) restricted competing access to these plains from the 
west. More importantly, the Ottoman administration enjoyed exclusive control over trade in 
the Black Sea, which meant that the Black Sea shores and the lower Danube could be kept 
relatively safe from the impact of foreign demand through effective controls on the straits.
28 
Accordingly, the northwest littoral of the Black Sea and the Danubian coasts were preferred 
to other places in Istanbul’s grain provisioning.
29 The coasts of western Anatolia were only 
considered a secondary option.
30 It was only when the shortage was severe and grain brought 
from these regions did not meet the needs of the capital that orders for grain dispatches were 
sent to places as far as Kefe, Tripoli, the Eastern Provinces (such as Erzurum, Sivas, and 
Tokat), and Istanbul’s former grain depot Egypt.
31 
The political domination over a large surplus-producing region (the capacity to 
enforce, at least legally, export bans and internal barriers) and the abundance of waterways 
 
27   Özveren (2003: 225). 
28   McGowan (1987: 14-5) and Beydilli (1991: 687).   
29   M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca (1958: 15) and Özveren (2003: 228). Mantran (1990, 1: 175, 182), Güçer 
(1951-1952: 87), Kütükoğlu (1999: 569), McGowan (1977: 13). 
30   Mantran (1990, 1: 175, 182), Güçer (1951-1952: 87), Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru (1988), and  
Emecen (1984: 199).   
31   See Güçer (1951-1952: 87-8), Mantran (1990, 1: 174-75), and Kütükoğlu (1999: 569).   10 
 
                                                     
and coasts (the cheapest way to transport grain in the pre-industrial era)
32 enabled  the 
Ottoman administration to create a large redistributive network that would guarantee the 
affordable supply of grain to a city with more than four thousand inhabitants.
33 In order to 
function, however, this redistributive mechanism necessitated a large network of 
intermediaries to control the flow of grain from the provinces to Istanbul and who had to be 
rewarded for their services. The requisition agents and supervisors assisted by the local 
judges and other provincial officials, were authorized to manage the allocation of the regional 
quotas among households and prevent smuggling. In return for their service, these agents 
were assigned a certain portion of the purchases, which they could sell at the Kapan for 
profit, as other merchants did.
34 The incentives for these agents to favor certain groups over 
others in the allocation process and to collaborate with the local grain owners and the 
merchants to misrepresent the volume of production and shipment are obvious.
35 
Furthermore, due to the lack of a centrally-organized and financed bureaucratic network in 
the provinces, in many cases, the administration had to assign local notables as the requisition 
agents with active role in quota allocation.
36 Since many of these notables were themselves 
tax-farmers and land-holders, their compliance with the official regulations was in conflict 
with their interests as grain owners. Not surprisingly, there is ample evidence suggesting that 
they used their prerogatives to further their own ends.
37 In the context of this large network of 
intermediaries, controls could only serve their purposes as long as the cost of smuggling (i.e., 
 
32   Overland transportation of grain for a distance of around 200-300 miles was more than enough to 
double the price of grain, while overseas transportation amounted between 15 and 25 percent of the purchase 
price of the grain shipped. See Güçer (1964: 29), Kütükoğlu (1983: 92), and Aynural (2001: 25-26). 
33   For various estimates of Istanbul’s population see Güran (1998: 16) and Akarlı (1972). 
34   MAD, 8571, p. 21, 28.5.1204 (13.2.1790) and MAD, 8571, p. 233, 9.8.1205 (13.4.1791) in Güran 
(1998: 24). 
35   For some examples of such activities prior to the eighteenth century, see 82 Numaralı Mühimme 
Defteri, no. 57 [309], 1617-1618, p. 37, 85 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, no. 222 [460], 1630-1631, p. 134 , 
Cook (1972: 5), Emecen (1984: 203-204), Faroqhi (1979-1980: 139-154). ZD, no 19, pp. 82, 9. 
36   For the rise of ayan as provincial notables, see McGowan (1994), Zens (2004), Nagata (1976: 346-61), 
Yaycıoğlu (2008). 
37   See ZD 19, C. BLD. 841. See also Güran (1984: 24, 39), Aynural (2001: 7-8, 75-76), Aksan 
(1995[2004]: 209) and Yaycıoğlu (2008: 250).  See Leake (1835, 4: 335–36) for the acts of Ali Pasha who was 
able to control most grain trade in Thessaly. 11 
 
                                                     
the legal and natural deterrence of smuggling) was high enough to supersede the returns to 
smuggling (the gap between the official price and the external price). 
If we assume, plausibly, that the organizational features of supervision and 
punishment of smuggling did not change,
38 an account of demographic and geopolitical 
changes in the last quarter of the eighteenth century indicate that the incentives for smuggling 
were rising over this period. On the demand side, the international price of grain was rising, 
creating an upward pressure on the illegal price of grain smuggled from Ottoman lands to 
other parts of Europe.
39 At the same time, the population of Istanbul was rising as a result of 
increasing migration from rural provinces struggling with social and economic problems.
40 
The forced purchases, justified on the grounds of sustaining Istanbul’s high population, were 
also seen as a source of discontent in the Balkans. As the contemporaries observed, in a 
vicious circle, rising population of Istanbul induced by rural problems augmented the 
pressure on the traditional hinterland, further exacerbating rural conditions and reinforcing 
migratory trends.
41 The endogenous relationship between redistributive policy and 
agricultural production, hence, implied a gradual decrease in grain supply coming from the 
hinterland.  
Parallel to the changes in the demographic structure, the capacity of the government 
to enforce controls was diminishing because of political and military troubles in the areas 
providing grain to Istanbul. With the expansion of the Russian presence along the northern 
coasts of the Black Sea region, especially after the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), the 
Ottoman government lost exclusive control over Black Sea trade.
42  After this opening in 
Black Sea trade, the Ottoman and Russian grain produced along the Black Sea coasts started 
 
38   Aynural (2001: 40-51), Genç (2004). 
39   Labrouisse (1932: 598-603), Vilar (1949: 29-45), Livi Bacci (2000).  
40   McGowan (1981: 121, 148).  
41   Penah Efendi (1769: 230).   
42   See Turgay (1990: 60) for the intensification of Ottoman-Russian competition in the Black Sea after 
the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty of 1774 and its implications for the grain trade. 12 
 
                                                     
inundating western Mediterranean markets.
43 This process was also formally acknowledged 
by the Ottoman authorities. In 1802, for instance, the Ottoman government began granting 
trade permits to foreign ships under certain conditions, marking a significant turning point in 
the Ottoman political economy.
44  
As a result of this severe geopolitical loss, the Mediterranean coasts became more 
important for the grain provisioning of Istanbul. The expansion of the supply zone 
southwards is proven by a large number of documents in the Ottoman archives ordering 
substantial purchases to be made from southern Mediterranean ports after the 1790s.
45 
According to the Grain Registers from 1794-95, 70 per cent of the wheat purchases for 
Istanbul were to be made from the Mediterranean coasts (primarily Anatolian and 
Macedonian produce).
46 The accounts of the Grain Administration from the period 1795-
1800, examined and summarized by Tevfik Güran, also indicate that 66.4 percent of all grain 
coming to Istanbul was purchased from the Mediterranean regions.
47 At the end of the 
eighteenth century, the administration had no choice but to condone illegal grain imports by 
the bakers’ guild, accepting the de facto end of the Ottoman self-sufficiency in grain.
48 
Parallel to the shrinking of Istanbul’s traditional hinterland, two redistributive pillars 
of the quota assessment system—price controls and forced purchases—came to be viewed 
not only useless but also counterproductive. Through several decrees promulgated between 
1774-83, the government tried to abolish the quota system, claiming they would “end the 
 
43   Harlaftis and Laiou (2008: 9-11) and Harlaftis (1996: 18-19).  
44   See Beydilli (1991: 691–93).  
45   See HH. 15/620, 29 Z 1203 tt [1789], C.İKT. 14/656, 18 C 1205 [22 02 1791], C. BLD. 4/177, 20 S 
1209 [September 15, 1794], C. BLD. 38/1882, 19 S 1209 [15 09 1794], C. BLD 28/1367, 20 Ş 1209 [12 03 
1795], C. BLD. 66/3256, 10 S 1210 [26 08 1795]. C. BLD. 38/1887, 10 N 1209 [31 03 1795] , C.İKT. 13/638, 
29 N 1210 [07 05 1796],  C. BLD. 71/3527, 16 Ca 1217 [14 09 1802], C.BLD. 4/180, 10 S 1219 [May 20, 
1804], C.BLD. 7/305, 1 R 1225 [May 5, 1810]. In addition to these places, the government had to have recourse 
to the grain produced in the regions along the Aegean coast to be transported to docks such as those in Kuşadası 
and Izmir. C. BLD. 58/2892, 10 Ca 1209 [03 12 1794]. C. BLD. 82/4097, 06 Za 1221 [15 01 1807]. 
46   ZD, no. 19.  
47   Güran (1998: 31). 
48   See C. BLD. 72/3551, 18 Za 1212 [04 05 1798]. 13 
 
                                                     
oppression of the poor.”
49 The removal of the quota system does not imply, however, that the 
export grain from these regions was allowed; all grain owners and producers were urged to 
send their surplus grain (except seeds for cultivation) to Istanbul. But now the quantities to be 
procured would not be assigned to each administrative region (kaza) as a whole, and the grain 
would be bought directly from the grain owners. By abolishing the quota system, the 
administration most probably expected to reduce the role of the notables in the allocation 
process, prevent their abuses, and thereby increase the amount of grain sent to Istanbul.  
At the same time, it was recognized that the purchase prices offered were much lower 
than the levels acceptable to the grain owners. In 1788, upon the request for his evaluation of 
the reasons for scarcity in Istanbul, the judge of Istanbul pointed to the price differentials 
between the supply zones and Istanbul’s city market. The purchasing price in Istanbul, he 
maintained, was much lower than the price in the places where grain was bought, and this 
differential discouraged grain owners to bring their grain to the market designated in Istanbul. 
As a solution, he suggested a rise in the grain purchasing prices in the locations where grain 
was bought.
50 Likewise, a decree promulgated in 1789-90 attributed the low quality of bread 
to the scarcity of grain, which itself was considered the result of low purchasing prices.
51 
Eventually in 1793, in order to encourage producers and grain owners to deliver more grain 
to the authorized buyers, the Imperial Council ordered that the purchasing prices to be set at 
the rayic price.
52 This was also the year when the Grain Administration was established to 
regulate the grain supply of Istanbul, marking a radical change in the way that the Ottoman 
state was to deal with Istanbul’s grain provisioning. In order to understand this peculiar 
 
49   ZD, no. 13, transcribed in Ergin (1995: 739). This text is dated 1776. Aynural (2002: 11) suggests that 
the system was abolished in 1783. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru (1992: 76)  notes that the system was 
abolished in 1774. This confusion about when the quota system was ended can be attributed to the fact that the 
forced purchases continued even after the quota system was removed.   
50   HH 23/1158, 1202 [1788].  
51   HH 266/15437, 1204 [1790]. 
52   Güran (1984: 31) and Şaşmazer (2000: 131, 157). Here I refer to “rayic” as “current” because in this 
context it is used not to refer to a price-setting process but to the price set through mutual consent in the 
marketplace. To be sure, it still implies a socially legitimate price and not just any price emerging in the market. 14 
 
                                                     
response to the problems in the grain supply, one has to look at the ideas of the reformers 
concerning alternative solutions. 
 
     III 
During the first year of his reign, Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) convened a grand 
council of dignitaries to discuss the future of the Ottoman Empire. Over two hundred 
members of the ruling class attended this council, some of whom later submitted memoranda 
to the sultan containing their analysis of the main problems of the Empire and their proposals 
for reform. The inherent drawbacks of the forced purchasing system, more specifically the 
abuses of the centrally-authorized intermediaries with pre-emptive privileges, were one of the 
shared themes of the reformers’ proposals. Tatarcıkzâde Abdullah Efendi (d. 1797),
53 one of 
the high-ranking officials in Ottoman judiciary, identified the illicit acts of the requisition 
agents as the main problem in Istanbul’s grain provisioning. He argued that these 
intermediaries abused their positions and tormented the peasantry to such an extent that the 
peasants had to abandon cultivation and migrate to other places.
54 
Despite his strong criticisms, however, he did not suggest removing the public 
purchasing system. Indeed, he devoted paragraphs to explain why, in spite of all its problems, 
the public purchasing system had to be kept in place. Abdullah Efendi argued that the 
removal of the public purchasing system would make it impossible to monitor and constrain 
the actions of private intermediaries, leading therefore to an increase in profiteering. For 
instance, they would be able to mix the high-quality grain produced in the Mediterranean 
region with the lower-quality grain from the Black Sea region and sell it for the higher price. 
A potential solution, according to Abdullah Efendi, would be to set separate prices for grain 
purchased from each region, in other words, to introduce price differentiation according to an 
 
53   For a brief summary of Tatarcıkzâde’s memorandum, see Özcan (1988). 
54   Ergin (1995: 739–42).  15 
 
                                                     
officially-designated market segmentation. But he acknowledged that it would more difficult 
to impose price controls for Mediterranean grain since smuggling from this region was 
relatively easy. The alternative would be the removal of all price controls. Yet this would 
generate a considerable rise in bread prices, something which, in Abdullah Efendi’s view, 
was not tolerable.
55 The idea that the removal of price controls would lead to rise in bread 
prices indicates that price control was still thought of as a feasible redistributive tool. It is 
difficult, however, to understand why Abdullah Efendi believed that the public (government-
authorized) purchasing agents were easier to control, given that they too engaged in 
smuggling and hoarding extensively, a fact that he himself underlines. Two explanations can 
be offered. Perhaps Abdullah Efendi assumed that the purchasing agents were relatively less 
inclined to violate the regulations because their assignment as officially-recognized agents 
included a host of local privileges that they would not want to lose. Or, as the assignment of 
the purchasing agents among local notables suggests, the center desperately needed the 
locally-acknowledged power and prestige of these intermediaries to determine and collect the 
amount of surplus output and thereby prevent the emergence of a black market, especially at 
a time when the technological capacity for central monitoring was limited.  
Abdullah Efendi was not against price controls per se, but he fervently advocated an 
increase in public purchasing prices and hence an increase in the purchase prices set in 
Istanbul. The low purchasing prices, he maintained, threatened producers’ livelihood and 
forced them to abandon their land, resulting in a perilous decline in agricultural production. 
Accordingly, he proposed that all grain coming to Istanbul should be purchased at the rayic 
price, set through “free bargaining” and “mutual consent.”
56 His ideas contributed directly to 
the reform initiatives of the period. In 1793, explicitly in order to encourage producers and 
grain owners to deliver more grain to the authorized buyers, the Imperial Council ordered that 
 
55   ibid. 
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purchasing prices to be set as rayic. As Abdullah Efendi had proposed, the purchasing system 
was not removed, but a central Grain Administration was established, whose aim, among 
others, was to better monitor purchasing agents.  
While Abdullah Efendi’s report seems to be the one most in line with 
contemporaneous policy changes, other statesmen’s views on grain trade are important to 
understand both the general intellectual environment of the period as well as the alternatives 
not taken. In his report, the Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Paşa also focused at length on the 
abuses of the requisition agents assigned to the allocation and procurement of grain supply 
for the capital. Supported by some political power-holders in Istanbul and in the provinces, 
the requisition agents, Yusuf Paşa maintained, took advantage of their privileges (i.e. 
preemptive rights and the right to in-kind fees in return for their services) by forcing the 
peasants to contribute more than their “just” share or by paying them less than the “just” 
value of the grain.
57 Like Abdullah Efendi, however, Yusuf Paşa did not consider abolishing 
the purchasing agents’ preemptive privileges as a viable strategy. Instead, he described in 
detail how these agents should be chosen and which rules and regulations should govern their 
acts.  
He argued that if rules for the storage and transportation of grain could be imposed 
appropriately, then grain could be bought for a price even below the official price (miri). In 
an attempt to support his argument, he added that the rayic price of grain produced in the 
Black Sea littoral was already lower than its official price and the rayic price of grain 
produced in the Mediterranean zones could be brought down to such low levels if smuggling 
could be prevented. Leaving aside the fact that his statement was blatantly false (the rayic 
price of grain purchased from the Black Sea littoral was indeed much higher than the miri 
price), the well-known difference in quality between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean 
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grains could have been a legitimate source of price disparity, to which Yusuf Paşa seemed 
oblivious. Furthermore, frequent complaints about the reluctance or inability of the grain 
owners in the Black Sea region to deliver the quota amount assigned to them stand in contrast 
to his rosy portrayal of the purchasing system.  
Why would Yusuf Paşa argue that prices could be easily brought down if profiteering 
by public and private agents could be prevented? As someone who served as grand vizier, did 
he genuinely imagine that profiteering could actually be suppressed by taking necessary 
supervisory measures, without letting prices up (or lowering incentives for smuggling)? It is 
more plausible to interpret his suggestion that tightening the control over the requisition 
agents might pull down grain prices more as a concern with the power of the local notables 
who acted as intermediaries in the grain trade than a realistic evaluation of the factors 
underlying the gap between real and desired price levels. Responding to the predicament in 
which the Ottoman central administration found itself in this era—the desire to curb the 
military and financial power of the local notables while being unable to rule without their 
assent and assistance—Yusuf Paşa had no choice but to envision ways to command the 
purchasing agents.    
The memoranda submitted by other Ottoman reformers to the sultan also point to the 
abuses of the requisition agents as one of the main problems of the public purchasing 
system.
58 Nevertheless, only Mehmed Şerif Efendi suggested ending the entire practice of 
public purchasing in grain market. He proposed a complete removal of the state purchasing 
system, after a one-time purchase for emergency state storage, on the grounds that 
eliminating the intermediary position of requisition agents in the grain trade would improve 
the links between the center and the producing provinces, thereby stimulating agricultural 
 
58   Ö ğreten (1989) refers to Koca Yusuf Paşa, El-Hac İbrahim Efendi, Tevki El-Hac Mehmed Hakkı Bey.  18 
 
                                                     
production.
59 Şerif Efendi’s subtle emphasis on the significance of unhindered commercial 
linkages between the provinces and the center for the development of agriculture is 
remarkably similar to the Physiocratic view that domestic free trade in grains would benefit 
agricultural production. Yet Şerif Efendi stands alone among the Ottoman ruling elite in his 
unreserved critique of the public provisioning system.  
Most reformers seem to have believed that removing the abuses in the system would 
be sufficient to ensure the well-being of the peasants and eliminate disincentives for 
agricultural production. Insistence on the forced purchases implied that the center would 
continue to authorize use of the local allocation mechanism (tevzi) to prevent the free 
movement of grain. It was implicitly assumed that when merchants operated freely according 
to their economic incentives, grain prices would rise even above the levels that were 
sufficiently high to sustain agricultural producers.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the 
trade-offs faced by the Ottoman reformers, as they perceived them, were not different from 
the trade-offs faced by their “illustrious” European counterparts. Like Pedro Rodríguez 
Campomanes (d. 1802)  in Spain or Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (d. 1781) in France, 
Ottoman bureaucrats such as Abdullah Efendi and Mehmed Şerif Efendi viewed a system 
based on private merchants and a regulated system with officially-authorized intermediaries 
as what might be called “imperfect alternatives” and gave serious thought to replacing the 
second with the first. Why the administration decided to retain the public purchasing system 
in the end, albeit reluctantly, is an important question that needs to be answered by a further 
study examining the peculiar institutional characteristics of economic organization along the 
commodity chain. At first glance, however, the relative weakness of the central Ottoman 
administration—its inability to manage provisioning without local notables—seems to be one 
of the reasons of the requisition agents’ continued presence in the provisioning network. 
 
59   See the report submitted by Şerif Efendi, transliterated by Çağman (1997: 217–33).   19 
 
                                                     
In line with the above-mentioned reports, the government did not abolish the 
purchasing system but sought to support producers and stimulate agriculture by way of 
allowing rayic price to prevail in purchases.
60 The same year price controls were lifted, so too 
was the license requirement to sell grain in Istanbul.
61 Grain owners, with no prior condition, 
were allowed to bring grain to Istanbul, to any place they wished, and ask for any price they 
wanted. This means that transactions were allowed to take place outside the officially 
designated market place. In addition to this relatively flexible attitude towards market forces,
 
the government involved itself in the grain trade more actively. In 1793, the year the miri 
price was abolished, the Grain Administration was established to regulate the grain supply of 
Istanbul.
62   
The Administration aimed to engage itself directly with the grain purchases and to 
keep at least 2 million kile (51,308 tons) of grain in the state storages.
63  If we assume that the 
annual amount of grain needed for Istanbul’s population  at that time was around 4 million 
kile (102,617 tons) per year,
64 this would amount to 50 percent of the grain required for 
Istanbul’s annual grain consumption. It is estimated that the state was able to store only forty 
 
60   Aynural (2001: 19) shows that most of the state purchases were made according to the rayic price in 
1810. See also HH. 225/12550B, 1212 [1798] and HH. 7/1853, 29 Z 1215 [13 05 1801], which refers to the 
rayic price as the preferred price in the purchases so that grain would be abundant in winter months. 
61   HH 7906 (1210) [1795–96].  
62   Cezar (1978: 119) refers to BA, HH 13951. Güran (1984–85: 29) refers to BA, MAD, no. 8591, pp. 4–
5, 19 03 1208 [25 10 1793]. Both documents are marked “in repair” and currently not accessible to the 
researchers in the Prime Ministery Archives.  
63   The tasks of the Grain Administration as they were defined by the by-laws issued in the same year 
were summarized by Güran (1998: 17–18). 
64   Aynural (2001: 4) bases this estimate on the grain distributed from kapan and state storaged to the 
bakers during 1756–62. Also, he supports his estimate with reference to the number of milling stones in the city. 
Güran (1998: 16), on the other hand, assumes that one person needs 8 kile (201 kg) wheat per year, and 
assuming that the populaton of Istanbul was 450,000 in the 1830s, he estimates the annual wheat consumption 
of the city at 3.6 million kile (92,400 tons). He supports this estimation with an account from Cevdet Paşa, who 
records that the grain requirement of the city was around 3 million kile when the Grain Administration was 
established (1795). Taking into consideration that between 1750s and 1790s Istanbul’s population rose 
significantly and that Aynural overestimates the grain need of the city due to negligence of excess capacity of 
milling/baking facilities; I assume Istanbul’s grain need was around 4 million kile at the time of the 
establishment of the Grain Administration.     20 
 
                                                     
days of supply in its granaries at the beginning of the eighteenth century.
65 Hence, this was a 
major attempt to increase the state’s capacity for grain storage.  
It took almost two years for the Grain Administration to secure the fiscal capacity 
necessary to pursue this attempt. In 1795, an independent budget (Zahire Hazinesi) was 
designed to finance the operations of the Grain Administration.
66 For the period 1795–1800, 
the average annual grain distributed by the Grain Administration each year was 
approximately 1.1 million kile (27,987 tons),
67 almost one-third of the city’s grain annual 
grain consumption. Although this amount was below the official objective, it was three times 
the annual average amount distributed by the state granaries during the period 1755–62.
68 As 
such, the Administration became the major grain merchant in the capital, buying the largest 
portion of the grain needed for Istanbul, storing it in the various granaries, and selling them at 
fixed prices to the bakers.  
  The Grain Administration statute book reconfirmed the abolishment of the fixed 
official price of grain and ordered all purchases to be made at the rayic price.
69 The 
preference for the rayic price, along with the earlier decrees abolishing the quota system 
implied that grain would be bought directly from grain owners. There is archival evidence, 
however, showing that the Administration continued to assign lump-sum quantities for some 
regions even after the abolishment of the quota system.
70 Yet, at the same time, it undertook a 
more active role in the local allocation process, especially in Macedonia, which was more 
lenient on smuggling because of its geographical position. Numerous orders in the Grain 
Registers recorded over this period instructed the requisition agents to purchase grain at the 
 
65   Murphey (1988: 231). According to the data provided by Aynural (2001: 63–64), I calculated that the 
average amount distributed from the state storages during 1755–62 was around 7 percent. 
66   The treasury was established after the nizamname promulgated in September 1795 (05 Ra 1210).  See 
Yavuz Cezar (1978: 122, 125).  
67   Güran (1998: 31). 
68   Aynural (2001: 63-64). 
69   Cezar (1978: 141).   
70   For a few examples, see ZD, no. 19, 27/1, 29/1, 108/2, 109/1.  21 
 
                                                     
rayic price, specifying the names of the wealthy grain owners and the amounts assigned to 
each.
71 Furthermore, the administration aimed to increase its control over requisition agents 
by auditing accounting registers and replacing in-kind payments with salaries,
72 which would 
allow it to forge a long-term financial relationship with intermediaries.  
The above account indicates that during the second half of the eighteenth century the 
Ottoman policy-makers’ increasing emphasis on the benefits of higher prices and a less 
coercive attitude in price-setting was accompanied by tighter regulation and supervision over 
the grain-trade network as well as a more direct involvement in the grain market. These 
seemingly contradictory policy changes could, in part, be explained in the context of 
conjectural changes in grain demand and supply, discussed in the previous part: As a result of 
the problems in the traditional hinterland, the supply zone expanded towards the 
Mediterranean coasts. This implied higher purchasing prices not only because purchases from 
these relatively far regions meant higher transportation costs but also because the government 
had to prevent contraband trade either through higher investment in policing or through 
higher prices offered to grain owners in these regions. While the shift in the hinterland that 
supplied the city dictated higher purchasing prices, the government was concerned that these 
higher prices would push bread prices up to socially unacceptable levels. It was most likely in 
an attempt to meet both objectives that the government decided to control a larger share of 
grain trade destined to Istanbul. This theory, however, does not fully capture the factors 
shaping the changing attitudes of the Ottoman administration towards pricing in grain market. 
The policy changes were also driven by an incipient desire to encourage agricultural 
production along quasi-Physiocratic lines and a newborn aspiration to emulate more 
developed states in economic policy. 
 
71   See ZD, no. 19, 19/1, 43/1, 54/1, 58/1. Also see Anastasopoulos (2007: 52) for the local judge registers 
that demonstrate how the system worked in Karaferye.  
72   See Cezar (1978: 149) 22 
 
                                                     
 
IV 
In this part, I will show that the state of agriculture was becoming an increasing economic 
concern of the Ottoman reformist elite, who not only aimed to ensure military competence 
and fiscal solvency, but were also eager to emulate ‘more developed’ states in their 
agricultural and industrial efforts. The emergence of a position that was more tolerant of 
higher consumer prices should also be placed within this context of rudimentary attempts at 
catching up.  
The increasing concern with the well-being of agricultural production can be 
observed, above else, in the reports mentioned above. The reformers observed that a 
multitude of economic, political, and military factors—including forced purchases and price 
controls—were causing the impoverishment of the peasants, the emigration of former 
proprietors, and the desolation of the lands in the Ottoman Balkans. In order to encourage 
rural re-population and agricultural output, which were considered the basis of political and 
military stability as well as the only remedy for the overpopulation of Istanbul, they 
advocated policy measures such as raising grain prices and reduction in compulsory 
procurement quotas.
73    
The suggestions of the memoranda writers, however, were not limited to removing the 
disincentives to agricultural production such as forced purchases or low purchase prices. 
They were also concerned with how to provide incentives for peasants to produce. More 
importantly, the condition of agricultural production in the Empire was discussed with an eye 
towards the practices of other states. Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, who was sent to Vienna as 
ambassador in 1791—to be later assigned as the first head of the Grain Administration—
wrote an ambassadorial report, in which he depicted the lamentable state of agriculture in the 
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Ottoman regions across which he traveled on his way to Austria. He then gave a detailed 
account of how the local authorities and the Austrian emperor encouraged agricultural 
production by distributing land and equipment to their farmers and granting them temporary 
tax exemptions.
74 Although he did not make an explicit comparison between the Austrian 
agricultural system and the Ottoman one, his remarks undoubtedly aimed to underline the 
problems he perceived in the Ottoman lands. He noted that in Austria, there were no 
purchasing agents who held official documents allowing them to force grain owners to sell 
their grain for low prices and that nobody was able to confiscate someone else’s grain. 
Therefore, he maintained, there was no motivation for hoarding; consenting producers and 
grain owners sold their entire surplus for the current price. Describing how freedom in grain 
trade ensured abundance in Austria, Ratib Efendi linked the ease with which the state agents 
were able to procure goods and collect taxes to the welfare of the subjects and the freedom 
they had over the use of their commodities—to the fact that “no one intervened with what 
they produced or consumed.”
 75 
It is important to note here that the concern with the economic policies of other states 
was by no means confined to the agricultural realm. Economic factors underlying the wealth 
and power of other states became the subject of intense interest and purposeful inquiry among 
the Ottoman elite for the first time during this period.
 In a treatise submitted to the Sultan in 
1803, Behic Efendi devoted a chapter on creating industry in Ottoman realms,
76 in which the 
notion of balance of trade is used to underline the significance of domestic production for 
wealth creation.
77    Along the lines of an infant-industry argument, he argued for the 
protection of domestic crafts from foreign competition until they were able to compete 
 
74   Arıkan (1996[1793]: 413–15). The reference to European practices in the proposals concerning 
agricultural production goes back to Penah Efendi. See Penah Efendi (1769: 399). 
75   Arıkan (1996[1793]: 197).   
76   Beydilli (1999: 50–52) is the first to note Behic Efendi’s emphasis on domestic industry and trade. For 
the transliteration of Sevânihü-l-Levâyih, see Çınar (1992).   
77   See Çınar (1992: 67). 24 
 
                                                     
themselves. Focusing especially on the Empire’s primary military rival, Russia, he offered 
specific ideas regarding how to encourage the production of skill-intensive commodities such 
as textiles, clocks and paper. He maintained that technological expertise should be imported 
through incentives (such as rewards and patents) that would attract foreign experts to the 
Empire.
78 
The use of Russia as a comparative model to be emulated in Behic Efendi’s treatise 
attests to the Ottoman elites’ increasing concern with economic competition during this 
period. The rapid transformation experienced by the Russian economy and society during the 
reign of Peter the Great was not only remarkable but also imitable in Behic Efendi’s view: 
The tsar had first examined the policies of other states and then encouraged skilled experts in 
sciences and crafts to come to Russia and train locals by offering a myriad of incentives. If 
even the Russians, who were as uncivilized as “wild animals” in Behic Efendi’s words, could 
prosper in such a short time span (in less than a hundred years) by emulating more developed 
states, the Ottomans could do even better.   
Similar ideas were also expressed ten years earlier by the Ottoman ambassador to 
Russia, Mustafa Rasih Efendi. Mustafa Rasih had noted that the success of Russian reforms 
under Peter the Great was based on the observation and successful emulation of European 
institutions and policies. The fact that Russia could improve its international position through 
reforms in the military and economic realms over such a short period of time (a “latecomer 
phenomenon” as it would be defined in the modern development literature) should have made 
it a suitable model for the Ottoman bureaucrats. In other words, Russian success in “catching 
up” was a promising example to be emulated by the Ottomans, for it was itself a case of 
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emulative strategy. These various examples indicate that emulation itself becomes the object 
of emulation for Ottoman reformers during this period.
79   
Among reformers of the Selim III era, Behic Efendi was the one who dwelled most on 
the question of economic competition and industrial development. Yet he was not the only 
one. The notions of balance of trade and import substitution, albeit in primitive forms, were 
already used by one of the Ottoman bureaucrats to advocate protectionist policies several 
decades earlier.
80 Furthermore, Behic Efendi’s willingness to encourage domestic industries 
through attracting foreign expertise was shared by some of his contemporaries.  
These emerging ideas concerning protection of the revenues accrued from industry 
and a heightened emphasis on the establishment of the transportation infrastructure within the 
empire during this period
81 reveal a proto-typical concept of “national market” and an 
incipient idea of protectionism among the Ottoman elite. As the idea of international rivalry 
expanded to include productive performance, the strength of the state came to be identified 
with the wealth of its subjects.
82 Hence, the notion of “wealth” (zenginlik), in addition to the 
“service to faith and Empire,”
83 gradually became a feature of the Ottoman political rhetoric. 
It was within the context of these ideas that willingness to follow the examples of the more 
developed nations started to become one of the currents of Ottoman economic thought and 
the more liberal attitudes towards pricing policy emerged. 
 Were the Ottoman reformers acquainted with or influenced by certain European 
writers? Were there any channels other than published material through which the Ottomans 
 
79   See Mustafa Râsih’s memorandum (1793) transliterated by Karakaya. (1996: 110–12).  For an earlier 
argument for emulation in military realm, see Aksan (1993: 56) referring to Müteferrika’s Usul ül-Hikem 
(1731), which was translated into French in 1769.   
80   See Penah Efendi (1769: 312, 399–400, 475–76) for such arguments. See also Yeşil (2007: 300).   
81   See Stein (1985a) and Stein (1985b) on how Ebubekir Ratib Efendi viewed Austrian financial 
practices as a model to be imitated.   
82   Penah Efendi (1769: 476) was the first to raise the question of how a state and its people become rich. 
Also, see Behic Efendi (1803: 67) who writes about “wealth of state.”   
83   Aksan (1993: 63) shows that the notion of “circle of justice” was slowly eroded and replaced with that 
of “service to faith and Empire” during the interval of peace from 1740 to 1768, primarily due to continuous 
defeat in the battlefield, and domination of scribal bureaucracy in the administrative affairs.  26 
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were informed about contemporary economic ideas in Europe? Could we place the Ottoman 
grain trade liberalization within the broader context of European Enlightenment? The current 
state of research in eighteenth-century Ottoman studies does not allow us to answer most of 
these questions in definite terms.
84 None of the memoranda mentioned in this paper, 
however, explicitly cites any European writer or source. Furthermore, there is no evid
indicating the introduction of the main European texts on political economy into the Ottoman 
realms during this period. Although Ebubekir Ratib Efendi reported that, in his visits to the 
libraries in Austria, the officials of the host government were astonished to see that he knew 
authors such as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu; it is not clear whether he actually read 
these books or became familiar with these names through other channels.
85 
The lack of explicit references to European sources during this period should not 
imply, however, that the Ottoman reformers were cut off from new ideas emerging in Europe. 
The acquaintance of reformers with actual practices in other countries through various formal 
and informal channels might have been sufficient to inform and infuse reform proposals. One 
of the primary aims of the establishment of permanent embassies in European capitals during 
this period was to establish channels that would allow the study of not only military but also 
political, social, and economic institutions of prominent European states.
 86 Consequently, 
Ottoman bureaucrats’ observations on the economic practices of other governments in 
Europe constituted an important source of information on foreign economic ideas, and in 
addition to other sources of information,
87  helped to shape the reform proposals submitted to 
 
84   Aksan (1993) and Aksan (1986 [1988]) provide a general survey of the possible Ottoman sources of 
information on Europe in the eighteenth century. 
85   See  Yeşil (2002: 62). 
86   For a general survey of Ottoman ambassadors and their reports (sefaretname) in the eighteenth 
century, see Unat (1968). For a more recently updated list and the role of ambassadorial reports as models for 
reform, see Yalçınkaya (1992: 5, 10–12, 161) and Stein (1985a: 223) . 
87   For instance, at a later date there is reference to a report written by the voyvoda of Wallachia on the 
protests in Britain upon the rise of grain prices due to import bans. HH. 1273/49348A, 21 R 1230 [02 04 1815]. 
An investigation of the similar documents in the Ottoman Archives could reveal further evidence about the 
Ottoman elite’s state of knowledge of European practices.   27 
 
                                                     
the sultan. Awareness of contemporary European tendencies in the realm of grain policy in 
particular is well-documented in these reports as well as in other material produced by the 
Ottoman bureaucrats.  
For instance, the French copy of a narrative of the Ottoman reforms written by 
Mahmut Raif Efendi in 1798 indicates that the removal of the forced purchases at the official 
price aimed to favor producers and agriculture. This copy, translated from Ottoman Turkish 
into French in order to address the European elite circles, is slightly different in its emphasis 
on the “promotion of agriculture” from the original written in Ottoman Turkish, indicating 
that the reformers were aware of the objectives of European policies. In texts addressing a 
foreign audience, they defined the alleged success of the reforms on similar terms:  
The price of the grain fixed by the Miry was formerly very low in most areas of 
the Empire, that the farmers who were forced to sell their grain for that price 
were aggrieved and that the Collectors did not lack a pretext for ignoring the 
people. The Imperial Majesty, purely driven by the desire to attract the love of 
his subjects, abolished this compulsory and orderly annuity so that the grains 
would be affordable in the future at current price. This wise arrangement 
generated abundance in the Military Fronts, in the Capital, in a word in the 
whole extent of the Empire. Especially the farmers will not cease to bless a 
monarch who deigns to protect and promote agriculture.
88  
 
Undoubtedly, the writings of the Ottoman reformers during this period were still imbued with 
the rhetoric of tradition
89 and imperial superiority, which might have precluded an outright 
borrowing of foreign institutions. Yet the attachment to the traditional rhetoric did not 
necessarily inhibit the indigenous emergence of quasi-Physiocratic ideas in the Ottoman 
context or a domestic preparedness for their reception. After all, in many cases, innovations 
and improvisations were justified as pragmatic responses to the exigencies of the times rather 
than outright reform. What may be more important than the Ottoman reformers’ access to 
 
88   Translated from the text in French, see  “Pour les Approvisionnemens des Armées et de la Capitale” 
from Tableau des Nouveaux Règlemens de l’Empire Ottoman, by Mahmut Raif Efendi. See Arslan Terzioğlu 
and Hatemi (1988: 15–16) for the French text and Beydilli (2001: 66) for the Ottoman text.  
89  See Heyd (1993: 37, 48, 53).  28 
 
foreign ideas was their unprecedented willingness to emulate, albeit selectively, “more 
developed” states. It was within this context that an incipient notion of wealth and 
international competition started to replace religious and moral precepts that hitherto 
legitimized pervasive use of price controls in the grain trade. 
 
V 
In the current literature on Ottoman political economy, changes in Ottoman grain 
trade policies in the second half of the eighteenth century have been understood as both a 
practical response to the deteriorating problems of Istanbul’s provisioning and a part of the 
early reform attempts of fiscal centralization in the Empire. From this perspective, the 
changes in Ottoman grain-trade policies in the second half of the eighteenth century stand in 
complete contrast, or at best incomparable, to the European experience. In studying the 
rationales behind the establishment of this institution from a broader political economy 
perspective, however, this paper presented another picture. 
  The reform attempts did not merely aim at centralization. Price controls on wholesale 
of grain were gradually relaxed, and, although barriers to internal trade were not removed, a 
system based on a network of private merchants was considered a serious alternative to the 
public purchasing system. Furthermore, an analysis of the texts in which the reformers 
discussed grain-trade policies shows that the policy shift was not just a practical response to 
the problems of provisioning, but also reflected a new concern with the state of agricultural 
production, embedded in the emergence of quasi-Physiocratic ideas along a new competitive 
outlook among the Ottoman reformist elite.  
Examining the evolution of changes in Ottoman grain policy in the late eighteenth 
century within a broader framework has provided important insights into the nature of 
Ottoman instititutional changes. Neither conjectural changes nor traditional priorities alone 29 
 
can explain the direction of the reforms. First, policy-makers believed there was more than 
one option available against the challenges presented by the conjectural changes in grain 
markets. Second, the choices made by policy-makers did not necessarily reflect the so-called 
traditional priorities of the Ottoman state (i.e. fiscalism). Given an increasing concern with 
the development of the productive sectors of the economy against a background of an 
expanded notion of international competition, Ottoman policy-makers were more willing to 
adopt a relatively tolerant attitude towards market forces. This willingness along with 
alternative responses envisioned against strains on traditional policy tools brought about the 
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